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Explaining the American Norm
Against Litigation
Shawn J. Bayemt
INTRODUCTION
In the United States, a social norm discourages people from vindicat-
ing at least some of their rights in court. However, if courts are an instru-
ment of justice and of sound public policy-for instance, if they provide
fair compensation for injured parties and efficient incentives for potential
injurers-then a norm against using courts is puzzling.
This Comment explores and evaluates explanations for the norm
against litigation; the Comment's goal is to provide a plausible account of
the norm. As such, the Comment is largely descriptive. However, norma-
tive implications may follow from my exploration; for instance, to the ex-
tent that an explanation of the norm is plausible, the explanation may help
to frame the debate about tort reform in the United States.'
By referring to a "norm against litigation," I do not mean to suggest
that there is a norm against all lawsuits under all circumstances. The norm
against litigation is clearly stronger in some cases and weaker--or nonexis-
tent-in others. For instance, there appears to be a particularly strong norm
against "litigiousness"--against filing lawsuits too readily.2  Similarly,
there are salient norms against "nuisance lawsuits"3 and against suits that
Copyright © 2005 California Law Review, Inc. California Law Review, Inc. (CLR) is a California
nonprofit corporation. CLR and the authors are solely responsible for the content of their publications.
t J.D. candidate, School of Law, University of California, Berkeley (Boalt Hall), 2006. This
Comment is based on a paper I wrote for a seminar on law and social norms taught by Amir Licht; I
thank Professor Licht and the seminar's students. I also especially thank Professor Mel Eisenberg for
extremely helpful comments, and I am indebted to Megan Lorenz, Jocelyn Sum, Steve Swerdlow, and
Meliah Thomas of the California Law Review for terrific editing.
I. This Comment advances some explanations that are etiological and some that are
teleological; in other words, the Comment considers both explanations that account for how the norm
arose and explanations that characterize the purposes it may presently serve.
2. Indeed, at common law, "frequently exciting and stirring up quarrels and suits" was a
criminal offense. 1 JOHN BOUVIER, BOUVIER'S LAW DICTIONARY AND CONCISE ENCYCLOPEDIA 327
(Francis Rawle ed., 1914) (defining "barratry"). And of course the very word "litigious" carries a
negative connotation. See OxFoRD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 1037 (2d ed. 1989) (listing contextual
examples of the word "litigious," including "litigious, or ful of stryf," "litigious and malicious wifes,"
"They... are very litigious.... They will persevere in a law-suit till they are ruined," and "litigious
fool").
3. See infra text accompanying notes 65 and 89.
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are perceived to provide windfalls in response to sham injuries.4 This
Comment's concern, however, is not with these subcategories of norms
against obviously problematic lawsuits; this Comment instead describes a
broader pattern whereby some meritorious lawsuits, in general, might not
be filed.
The Comment begins, in Part I, by describing the scope and extent of
litigation in the United States and by characterizing the norm against litiga-
tion. Parts II and III analyze the norm against litigation in economic
terms: Part II focuses on the possibility that the norm against litigation
promotes social welfare generally, whereas Part III considers explanations
that suggest that the norm derives from the manipulative efforts of concen-
trated, self-interested groups. Part IV considers noneconomic explanations
for the norm; these accounts attempt to apply insights from psychology and
from moral philosophy. Part V briefly considers the Comment's potential
normative implications.
I
LITIGATION, AND THE NORM AGAINST IT, IN THE UNITED STATES
This Part characterizes the nature and scope of the American norm
against litigation. To introduce the subject, Part I.A describes widespread
criticisms of litigation in America. Part I.B uses evidence of these criti-
cisms, as well as other evidence and analysis, to make the claim that there
is an American norm against litigation-as opposed merely to a practice of
criticizing litigation.
In discussing social norms, this Comment refers specifically to
"obligational norms," as Professor Eisenberg defines the term.' That is, I
do not use the term "norm" to refer to mere behavioral patterns and prac-
tices that are not associated with social obligations, such as wearing warm
clothes in cold weather.6 Rather, the term "norm" in this Comment refers to
practices that actors feel obliged to follow.
Some norms, even in this obligational sense, are trivial and not worth
further analysis; for instance, many norms merely coordinate behavior,
4. Cf infra note 49. Indeed, one very simple explanation for the existence of a general norm
against litigation is that these specific sub-norms may bleed over into the general case because of the
difficulties observers face in distinguishing meritorious lawsuits from nonmeritorious ones. Cf infra
text accompanying note 59 (suggesting that norms against a particular type of lawsuit may discourage
lawsuits more generally).
5. See Melvin A. Eisenberg, Corporate Law and Social Norms, 99 COLUM. L. REv. 1253, 1257
(1999). Professor Eisenberg defines obligational norms as "rules or practices that actors not only self-
consciously adhere to or engage in, but feel obliged in some sense to adhere to or engage in, although
(by hypothesis) the rule or practice is neither a legal nor an organizational rule." Id. A social norm is
obligational if "a departure from the norm is likely to involve either self-criticism or criticism by
others." Id.
6. See id. at 1256.
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providing a necessary focal point.7 The norms that call for further explana-
tion are those that cause people to act in ways that violate the rational-actor
model of classical economics-that is, to act in ways that suggest the actor
has forgone an opportunity to maximize his or her own utility.8
Under some accounts of social norms, norms are internalized, in
which case they affect actors' preferences directly. Under other accounts,
norms are enforced by external sanctions, in which case actors perform a
cost-benefit analysis that includes potential social disapproval, loss of
business opportunities, and so forth.9 This Comment does not attempt to
provide a new account for people's adherence to norms generally, nor does
it depend exclusively on either an internal or an external account of norms.
A. Criticism of Litigation in America
Criticisms of litigation are far more common than praise of it. As
Marc Galanter has noted, "A battery of observers has concluded that
American society is over-legalized."'"
One does not need to look deeply into American political culture to
find criticisms of litigation and discouragement from litigating. In 1982,
Chief Justice Burger criticized the tendency of Americans to litigate by
citing no less an authority than Abraham Lincoln, who said, "Discourage
litigation. Persuade your neighbors to compromise whenever you can."''
Burger continued:
One reason our courts have become overburdened is that
Americans are increasingly turning to the courts for relief from a
range of personal distresses and anxieties. Remedies for personal
wrongs that once were considered the responsibility of institutions
other than the courts are now boldly asserted as legal
"entitlements." The courts have been expected to fill the void
created by the decline of church, family, and neighborhood unity. 2
7. See, e.g., id. at 1257 n.7 (noting that, even without a legal sanction, it may be in people's
interest to drive on the customary side of the road).
8. See id.; Amir N. Licht, Social Norms and the Law: A Social Institutional Approach 22 (Mar.
2005) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://ssm.com/abstract-710621 (noting that compliance
with social norms that reflects "direct self-interestedness" is "trivial"). As Eisenberg notes, "utility"
sometimes appears to be confused with simple "wealth" in this context. Eisenberg, supra note 5, at
1257 n.7. Under a broader conception of "utility," parties may well be maximizing their own utility by
following social norms. Broadening the concept of utility to include noneconomic factors such as guilt,
however, adds no explanatory or predictive power to the rational-actor model; it simply changes a
definition. The important point is that norms are nontrivial when they cause people to act in a way that
does not appear to be in their self-interest without the existence of the norm.
9. See Eisenberg, supra note 5, at 1257-61; Licht, supra note 8, at 32-36.
10. Marc Galanter, Reading the Landscape of Disputes: What We Know and Don't Know (and
Think We Know) About Our Allegedly Contentious and Litigious Society, 31 UCLA L. REV. 4, 6 & n.4
(1983) (collecting numerous sources).
11. Id.
12. Warren E. Burger, Isn't There a Better Way?, 68 A.B.A. J. 274, 275 (1982).
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Similarly, as recently as the third Bush-Kerry Presidential Debate of
2004, President Bush argued that "[w]e have a problem with litigation in
the United States of America."13
American popular culture, too, reflects a distrust of litigation. For in-
stance, a recent movie depicts superheroes driven into hiding by lawsuits
(including one filed by a "suicide victim irate that his life was saved"). 4
And according to a review, a self-help book published in 2004 advises
readers to stop blaming others-and suing others-for "things ... that are
no one's fault."15
Even some practicing lawyers believe that courts are overused. The
president of the Iowa State Bar Association said the following in a recent
interview: "There is way too much litigation. But it reflects society. We are
living in an in-your-face, contentious society that turns to the courts to re-
solve disputes. Until society calms down, this is going to continue."16
Researchers of social norms have found many people who speak out
against litigation. For example, Robert Ellickson's influential work quotes
several criticisms of litigation generally:
"I'm not that kind of guy;" "I don't believe in it;" "I don't like to
create a stink;" "I try to get along." . . . "I figure it will balance out
in the long run.".. . "I hope they'll do the same for me."... "My
family believes in 'live and let live."' 17
These beliefs-or beliefs similar in spirit-do not appear to be un-
common throughout the United States. Like the commentator who sug-
gested that litigants need to "calm[] down,"' 8 many critics of litigation
suggest that litigants are childish or improperly socialized. For example,
one editorial discusses a "recent incident [that] underscores some of
American society's current banes: a penchant for whining [and] excessive
litigiousness."' 9 Similarly, some observers suggest that litigation is
13. President George W. Bush, Commission on Presidential Debates, The Third Bush-Kerry
Presidential Debate (Oct. 13, 2004), available at http://www.debates.org/pages/trans2004d.html.
14. See James Berardinelli, Review: Incredibles, The (2004), available at http://movie-
reviews.colossus.net/movies/i/incredibles.html.
15. Jacquelyn Mitchard, The "Not-My-Fault" Generation Would Do Better to Live in "The
Now," CHATTANOOGA TIMES FREE PRESS, Sept. 25, 2004, at E3 (reviewing HAMILTON BEAZLEY, No
REGRETS: A TEN-STEP PROGRAM FOR LIVING IN THE PRESENT AND LEAVING THE PAST BEHIND
(2004)).
16. Santiago Frank, Lawyer Says Public Needs Legal IQ Help, DES MOINES REG., Nov. 9, 2004,
at 2B. Senator John Edwards, a well-known trial lawyer, seems to agree. See Jon Robins, A Pair of
Lawyers Who Could Change the World, THE TIMES (London), Nov. 2, 2004, at 3 ("'We do have too
many lawsuits,' Edwards told the American public. 'And the reality is there's something that we can do
about it. John Kerry and I have a plan to do something about it.')
17. Robert C. Ellickson, Of Coase and Cattle: Dispute Resolution Among Neighbors in Shasta
County, 38 STAN. L. REV. 623, 681-82 (1986).
18. Frank, supra note 16, at 2B.
19. Editorial, Only a Game; Holden Soccer Episode Sign of Times, TELEGRAM & GAZETTE
(Mass.), Nov. 15, 1996, at A10.
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generally unsportsmanlike: "'Turning a sports venue into an arena for liti-
giousness is demoralizing,' says John Hoberman, an Olympic historian at
the University of Texas in Austin. 'It erodes the meaning of what the
[Olympic] Games are supposed to be.' 21
B. The Norm Against Litigation
What motivates these criticisms? One possibility is that they are sim-
ply empty speech, unrelated to behavioral patterns. Indeed, despite the
widespread criticism of litigation, America is still commonly regarded as
one of the most litigious countries in the world. For instance, it is widely
reported that 70% of the world's lawyers work in the United States. 1
Similarly, some observers claim that there are thirty times more lawsuits
per year, per person in the United States than in Japan.22 Professors Cooter
and Ulen report that in 2002, there were twenty million civil cases in the
United States. 23 Though some commentators question the claim that there
has been a recent "litigation explosion" in the United States,24 it is clear
that litigation is not uncommon here.
To put this differently, many individuals who believe they can profit
by litigating make the decision to litigate, even if it means they will be
criticized as "whining," unsportsmanlike, or uncooperative. Indeed, litigat-
ing represents a common behavioral pattern: many people, when injured,
will sue. The existence of this pattern is not surprising; it is in a potential
plaintiffs interest to file a lawsuit with a positive expected value.25
JAccordingly, to the extent that there is a behavioral practice of litigating in
the United States, it is a practice of the "trivial" variety; 26 it is not particu-
larly puzzling and does not demand further explanation.
There are several reasons, however, to believe that many individuals
adhere to a countervailing norm against litigating-that is, that the various
criticisms of litigation are not empty speech but reflect a tendency by some
people to refrain from suing despite having suffered a legally compensable
20. Mark Sappenfield, Athletic Prowess, Fallible Judging, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR (Boston),
Aug. 25, 2004, at 2.
21. See Marc Galanter, An Oil Strike in Hell: Contemporary Legends About the Civil Justice
System, 40 ARIZ. L. REV. 717, 733-37 (1998). Note that Galanter is skeptical of the claim he reports.
22. See, e.g., David Gergen, Editorial, America's Legal Mess, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., Aug.
19, 1991, at 72; see also Kirk W. Dillard, Illinois' Landmark Tort Reform: The Sponsor's Policy
Explanation, 27 Loy. U. CHI. L.J. 805, 811 n.27 (1996) (noting that each year "[t]here are 70,000
product liability lawsuits in the United States... and only 200 in the United Kingdom"). Dillard also
notes that "American companies have been paying liability insurance premiums 20 to 50 times higher
than those paid by foreign firms." Id. (citing PRESIDENT'S COUNCIL ON COMPETITIVENESS, AGENDA
FOR CIVIL JUSTICE REFORM IN AMERICA 3 (1991)).
23. ROBERT COOTER & THOMAS ULEN, LAW AND ECONOMICS 442 (4th ed. 2004).
24. See, e.g., Galanter, supra note 10.
25. For an economic model that shows how the expected value of lawsuits can be computed, see
COOTER & ULEN, supra note 23, at 392-96.
26. See supra notes 6-8 and accompanying text.
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injury. (Such individuals may not sue even when presented with an oppor-
tunity to file a lawsuit with a positive expected value.) The following
Section considers the evidence for this proposition.
1. Comparing the Number of Lawsuits and the Number of Injuries
Though many lawsuits are filed in the United States, it is important to
consider the number of lawsuits in relation to the number of legally com-
pensable injuries that occur. Of course, this latter number is not easily iden-
tifiable by empirical methods; for example, it is likely very difficult to
accurately count all instances of compensable property damage that result
in no legal action. Nonetheless, it is important to keep in mind that a large
number of lawsuits does not imply that most injuries result in lawsuits;
even with 20 million lawsuits per year,27 there might be a large number of
uncompensated injuries. It is logically possible that while there are many
lawsuits, there are nonetheless many people who adhere to a practice of not
litigating.
Moreover, there are two reasons to believe that many compensable
injuries actually-rather than just possibly-remain uncompensated in the
United States.
First, speaking mathematically, even with twenty million lawsuits per
year, most people do not file lawsuits most of the time. The "20 million
lawsuits" figure comes from 2002;2" in this year, the United States popula-
tion was about 280 million.29 Based on a simple mathematical model that
uses these figures and makes assumptions that overestimate the likelihood
that an individual chosen at random will file a lawsuit, it still takes ten
years for a majority of the population to have filed a single lawsuit.30
Second, sociological research adds support to the claim that many
compensable injuries are not in fact compensated."
27. See COOTER & ULEN, supra note 23, at 442.
28. Id.
29. See U.S. Census Bureau, Population Change: July 1 2001 to July 1, 2002,
http://www.census.gov/popest/states/files/NST-EST2004-POPCHG2002.csv (last visited Sept. 29,
2005).
30. My model makes the following assumptions: (1) each suit is filed by an individual, not a
corporation; (2) the population and number of lawsuits do not change from year to year; and (3) the
likelihood that an individual files a suit is independent of his or her previous filing history. These
assumptions are not meant to be realistic; they are meant only to enable a simple model that
demonstrates the rough likelihood that any particular individual will file a lawsuit in a given year.
31. William L.F. Felstiner et al., The Emergence and Transformation of Disputes: Naming,
Blaming, Claming..., 15 LAW & Soc. REv. 631, 636 (1980) ("We know that only a small fraction of
injurious experiences ever mature into disputes . . . . [E]xperiences are not perceived as injurious;
perceptions do not ripen into grievances; grievances are voiced to intimates but not to the person
deemed responsible."). Note that if individuals do not even recognize an injury, they are not following
a norm against litigation by not seeking compensation for it; recall that the definition of "norm" I use
requires self-conscious adherence. See supra note 5. Nonetheless, even perceived injuries may not
mature into disputes. See Felstiner et al., supra, at 639-49.
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2. The Internalization of Uniform Signals
Moreover, it is unlikely that pervasive criticisms of a practice have no
effect on people's behavior-even if people do recognize their injuries.
Consider Professor Cooter's analysis of consensus obligations-that
is, of situations in which most people profess to agree about a behavioral
obligation. Of course, it is important to keep in mind, as Cooter notes, that
"[a]n analysis of consensus obligations must distinguish between what
people say and what they do. Everyone may say that people ought to do
something that they do not do."32
Thus, suppose, for a moment, that criticism of litigation begins as
merely empty speech, for the ordinary person has little incentive to say that
he or she favors filing lawsuits as a matter of course. To be sure, some in-
dividuals may-as Cooter also notes-wish to develop a reputation for
sternly or harshly enforcing their rights; such a reputation may discourage
other individuals from wronging them.33 Similarly, the plaintiffs bar-and
those who promote consumer protection-may publicly promote litiga-
tion.34 But a typical, individual citizen is likely to see a lawsuit as a failure
to cooperate; indeed, every lawsuit represents a failure to settle, and set-
tlement is a form of bargaining. Therefore, public criticism of litigation
might simply be a way for people to promote themselves to potential bar-
gaining partners. Criticizing failures to negotiate is like criticizing lying; in
Cooter's terms, it demonstrates an "admiration for" a virtue that facilitates
cooperation.35 And people can express admiration for values they do not
really admire.36
In this sense, the practice of criticizing litigation may represent a
straightforward "uniform signaling equilibrium" as described by Cooter.37
But if this is true, then Cooter's own analysis suggests that some people
will internalize the values that the consensus articulates; this, in turn, will
affect behavior:
Moral consensus is a kind of beneficial rat race. Like a rat race,
people compete with each other to proclaim their admiration for,
and commitment to, morality. The result, however, is beneficial,
because the consensus causes some people to internalize morality,
32. Robert Cooter, Normative Failure Theory of Law, 82 CORNELL L. REV. 947, 954 (1997).
33. See id. at 970 (positing "the benefit of gaining a stem reputation, which deters future
injuries").
34. See, e.g., Amy Kaslow, Nader Remains Unbowed by Volley of Criticism, THE CHRISTIAN SCI.
MONITOR (Boston), Jan. 25, 1994, at 14 ("Nader counters that there is not enough litigation. 'We file
fewer suits per capita than we did in 1930,' repeating one of the facts he often draws on. 'Law and
order means using the law against disorder. Not only in the streets but in the corporate suites."').
35. Cooter, supra note 32, at 964-65.
36. See id. at 964.
37. See id. at 954 (defining a uniform signal as "a situation in which everyone transmits an
identical signal").
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which shifts the evolutionary equilibrium toward more cooperation
and production.38
Accordingly, the mere presence of widespread criticism of litigation-a
uniform, or nearly uniform, signal-is likely to decrease the amount of liti-
gation in the United States. More specifically, it is likely to cause some
potential plaintiffs who have an injury not to file a lawsuit-at least some
of the time.
3. The Nature of the Criticism Against Litigation
Other evidence suggests that the widespread criticisms of litigation
are associated with a behavioral practice of forgoing the opportunity to liti-
gate.
First, according to a recent-though partisan-study, "Businesses file
about four times as many lawsuits as individuals represented by trial
lawyers."39 Because criticism of litigation appears to be aimed mostly at
individuals, the study's evidence is consistent with (though, of course, does
not establish) the proposition that this criticism affects individual behavior.
Second, criticisms of litigation tend to have moral overtones, as if
they were spoken to punish those who violate a norm. Criticisms of litiga-
tion could easily be expressed in morally neutral terms. Litigation need not
be "demoralizing," nor need it be compared to "whining"; it might simply
be called "inefficient" or "irritating." That the criticism is moral suggests-
particularly to those who believe that social norms are enforced primarily
by social rewards and punishment-that it serves to enforce a norm.
Third, Ellickson's research of dispute resolution in Shasta County un-
covered a norm of not litigating, not merely a practice of speaking out
against litigation. Indeed, Ellickson's study documents a "norm against the
invocation of formal legal rights" that is "strongly established. ' And there
is no reason to suppose that Shasta County is unique or that the norm there
arises from cultural values different from those prevalent in the rest of the
United States.4'
38. Id. at 965. For a list of psychological sources that attempt to explain the mechanisms by
which this internalization of morality proceeds, see id. at 956 n.48 (citing Freud, Piaget, Sherif,
Cialdini, and Kohlberg).
39. Congress Watch, Public Citizen, Frequent Filers: Corporate Hypocrisy in Accessing the
Courts 4 (Oct. 2004), available at http://www.citizen.org/documents/FrequentFilers_FINAL.pdf.
40. Ellickson, supra note 17, at 680-81. For a more comprehensive presentation of Ellickson's
research, see generally ROBERT C. ELLICKSON, ORDER WITHOUT LAW: How NEIGHBORS SETTLE
DISPUTES (1991).
41. On the relationship between cultural values and social norms, see generally Licht, supra note
1704 [Vol. 93:1697
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4. Puzzles Surrounding the Criticism Itself
Even putting aside the norm against litigation, the criticism itself is
still curious (and raises a puzzle similar to the one that the norm raises).
That is, if a society values justice and efficiency, it seems consistent for its
members to proclaim, "I value my rights and intend to redress wrongs,"
rather than to express an aversion to litigation. Indeed, someone who re-
fuses to pursue a financially advantageous lawsuit could appear to be fi-
nancially ignorant or insufficiently vigilant, both of which would decrease
his or her attractiveness as a business partner. Furthermore, while litigation
does represent a failure to bargain, it does not necessarily represent an
unreasonable failure to bargain. We don't criticize all such failures; for
example, Americans are likely to praise a potential crime victim who at-
tempts to prevent the crime unilaterally without negotiation, and it is com-
mon to express support for national leaders who refuse to "negotiate with
terrorists. ' 42
II
EXPLANATIONS OF THE NORM IN TERMS OF SOCIAL WELFARE
As I noted supra, Chief Justice Burger attributed the following advice
to Abraham Lincoln: "Discourage litigation. Persuade your neighbors to
compromise whenever you can."'43 Lincoln's quotation comes with a spe-
cific justification, for it continues: "Point out to them how the nominal
winner is often a real loser-in fees, expenses, and waste of time."'44 Of
course, this justification is a straightforward economic argument: litigation
can be wasteful, and lawsuits may leave even successful plaintiffs worse
off.
However, in cases where a plaintiff is indeed a "real loser," no social
norm is necessary to prevent litigation. That is, a rational-actor model is
sufficient to explain why people forgo litigation in cases where a lawsuit
will yield a net expected loss (in terms of fees, waste of time, and so forth).
The norm against litigation is of interest only because it influences the be-
havior of those potential plaintiffs who face a net expected gain from liti-
gation.45
In general, there are at least three economic reasons that a social norm
might discourage an individual from engaging in a practice that is indi-
vidually profitable. First, abstention from the practice may serve as a signal
42. See, e.g., Pam Belluck, Unrepentant Shoe Bomber is Given a Life Sentence for Trying to
Blow Up Jet, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 31, 2003, at A 13 (quoting a federal judge who said to a defendant, "You
are a terrorist, and we do not negotiate with terrorists. We hunt them down one by one and bring them
to justice."), quoted in Kyle M. Medley, Note, The Widening of the Atlantic: Extradition Practices
Between the United States and Europe, 68 BROOK. L. REV. 1213, 1218 n.27 (2003).
43. Burger, supra note 12, at 275.
44. Id.
45. See supra notes 6-8 and accompanying text.
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to other individuals; in the aggregate, society may benefit from people's
ability to distinguish themselves from differently situated parties by using
signals. Second, the individually profitable practice may impose external
costs on third parties, and the norm can, through social disapproval, cause
parties to internalize some of these costs. Third, people may at times be
motivated to act irrationally, and a social norm can help correct irrational
tendencies. This Part applies these general explanations to the norm against
litigation; Part II.A considers the first possibility, and Part II.B considers
the second two possibilities.
A. The Norm as a Signal
Whenever parties engage in activities against their own interests, one
possible explanation is that they are signaling their ability to incur a cost
that other, differently situated parties cannot afford to incur. This con-
spicuous-consumption model of social norms, which Eric Posner has ad-
vanced,46 suggests that parties might signal their wealth (or their discount
rate) by choosing to forgo an advantageous opportunity to vindicate their
rights in court.
For Posner, signals work as follows:
To avoid the possibility that [others] will not cooperate with them,
high types [i.e., those able to incur a particular cost] try to provide
credible evidence of their type by sending a signal to the receivers.
A signal is any costly action that, if successful, reveals the type of
the sender. A signal can distinguish [different types] only if [one
type] can afford to issue the signal and the [other] cannot.4 7
A signal in Posner's model is only effective if it communicates infor-
mation about the way a party perceives costs. A potential plaintiffs choice
not to litigate, however, will typically fail to send this kind of information
for several reasons.
First, the expected value of lawsuits is widely variable; a potential
plaintiff might sue for-and may have the legal right to recover-a small
sum, a large sum, or anything in between. However, the norm against liti-
gation does not carefully distinguish between cases based on their value;
plaintiffs in both small cases48 and large cases49 are routinely criticized, and
plaintiffs seem to suffer social disapproval without regard for the precise
46. See Eric A. Posner, Symbols, Signals, and Social Norms in Politics and the Law, 27 J. LEGAL
STUD. 765 (1998).
47. Id. at 768.
48. For instance, see supra text accompanying notes 18-20.
49. See, e.g., Liebeck v. McDonald's Rests., P.T.S., Inc., No. CV-93-02419, 1995 WL 360309
(N.M. Dist. Aug. 18, 1994) (the famous case in which a jury awarded the plaintiff $2.7 million in
punitive damages after she was burned by hot coffee).
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value of their lawsuits.5" If the norm against litigation represents merely an
opportunity to signal wealth or discount rate, however, we would expect
the norm to be sensitive to the amount of money a potential plaintiff for-
goes. Because it is not, it is hard to see how the norm can successfully dif-
ferentiate "high types" from "low types."
Second, the value of a lawsuit is often unknown to third parties-
particularly if the lawsuit is never filed. Many injuries occur in private, and
the extent of many injuries typically involves private costs (such as those
associated with "pain and suffering," medical bills, and so forth). A signal
is ineffective, however, if it conveys no information--or if it exposes only
ambiguous information-about the sender's wealth or discount rate.
Thus, forgoing an opportunity to litigate sends no clear signal; poten-
tial receivers of such a signal cannot deduce much information about the
sender. Moreover, Posner admits that people might engage in behavior for
different reasons;5 1 even if a practice can act as a signal, further analysis
may be necessary to explain the practice fully.
B. The Norm as a Way to Decrease Dispute-Resolution Costs
The norm against litigation may promote social welfare more di-
rectly-by decreasing the overall costs of dispute resolution. This Section
considers two ways in which the norm might have this efficient ef-
fect: (1) it may serve to bolster other social norms that attempt to provide
just compensation in small cases, and (2) it may counteract inefficient
incentives and psychological tendencies that decrease the likelihood of rea-
sonable cooperation.
1. Social Norms and Compensation for Small Injuries
As a matter of policy, the law typically gives no remedy to small inju-
ries. An old common-law maxim reads De minimis lex non curat-the law
does not care about trifles.52 For example, as Professor Eisenberg notes,
"most lawyers would probably believe that cutting in line, although a
moral wrong, is not in itself a legal wrong."53 A major reason for this pol-
icy is that the law represents expensive machinery; lawsuits take time, in-
volve high-paid lawyers and judges, incur other administrative costs, and
50. But see infra text accompanying notes 60-61. The point here, however, is that the norm
against litigation is not sensitive to a particular, narrow range of values, as would appear necessary for
the practice of abstaining from valuable litigation to communicate useful information under Posner's
model.
51. Posner, supra note 46, at 768-69 ("It should be emphasized that signals may be
ambiguous: gift giving, for example, may reflect a person's generosity or altruism rather than his
discount rate.").
52. 2 BOUVIER, supra note 2, at 2130.
53. MELVIN ARON EISENBERG, THE NATURE OF THE COMMON LAW 29 (1988).
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can result in adjudicative errors. Consequently, the law cannot address
every wrong effectively or fairly.
Nonetheless, small wrongs can still decrease social utility and ideally
call for redress; the law's limitations result from practical incapacities, not
from theoretical limitations. For instance, if a hot-dog stand or the
Department of Motor Vehicles could costlessly but perfectly prevent peo-
ple from cutting in line, we would probably want it to do so.
Small wrongs-even some for which the law does in fact provide a
remedy-might systematically be redressed or deterred more efficiently by
informal institutions than by formal ones. This increased efficiency comes
from two sources. First, because social norms are decentralized rather than
centralized, they can adapt to changing circumstances more readily.
Professor Cooter makes this point as follows:
[T]he urgency of bottom-up law increases with economic and
social complexity. As society diversifies and businesses specialize,
state officials struggle to keep informed about the changing
practices of people, and people struggle to make lawmakers
respond to changing practices. To loosen these constraints on
information and motivation, law must decentralize. Decentralized
law requires guidance from a theory of social norms ......
Though this characteristic of social norms applies both to large and to
small injuries, it may apply with more force to small injuries-that is, to
those that lie outside the attention of the legislature and the political proc-
ess. Second, as Professor Cooter also notes, norms are efficient because
they don't require formal enforcement by the state.55
Thus, norms can probably address small cases more efficiently than
courts can. This is true both for de minimis injuries (such as cutting in line)
and for small harms for which the law does provide a remedy (such as mi-
nor property damage). 6
Consider a system of such norms-for instance, of norms that provide
for just compensation of small property injuries among neighbors in a
small community.57 (As an example, such a system of norms might include
a specific norm like paying for damage caused by one's children even if
the law does not require this.) Members of the community may value this
normative system because of its overall efficiency and fairness. Lawsuits
54. Cooter, supra note 32, at 948.
55. See, e.g., Robert D. Cooter, Decentralized Law for a Complex Economy: The Structural
Approach to Adjudicating the New Law Merchant, 144 U. PA. L. REv. 1643, 1664 (1996) ("By
dispensing with the need for state enforcement, internalization of norms is the ultimate decentralization
of law.").
56. Indeed, this proposition may be true for some larger injuries too, but as I suggested, it is more
likely to be true for smaller injuries because (1) politicians spend little time thinking about the best
way to resolve small cases, and (2) the costs of the legal system are, in the case of small injuries,
proportionally larger when compared to the extent of the injury.
57. See, e.g., Ellickson, supra note 17.
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filed in response to small injuries, however, threaten the system; they dis-
courage cooperation, often require a defendant to spend money to hire a
lawyer, and so forth. Speaking more formally, they threaten to move the
community to a less efficient equilibrium.58 Potential plaintiffs may there-
fore refrain from suing in response to small injuries not because they see
litigation as a bad thing by itself; lawsuits may simply, when used to re-
solve small cases, threaten an independent system of efficient norms from
which the community benefits. 9
This analysis leads to an empirically testable proposition: if the norm
against litigation derives from or promotes a system of social norms that
efficiently addresses small injuries, then individuals and groups that sub-
scribe to the norm against litigation should be particularly unwilling to file
small lawsuits and more willing to file large lawsuits.6" Systematic empiri-
cal data on this point is unavailable, but it is interesting to note that some
critics of litigation do level their complaints more sharply at small lawsuits.
For instance, a Japanese professor has suggested that lawsuits are too com-
mon in the United States because "Americans 'use courts and lawyers for
very insignificant things. To them, it is an everyday affair, whereas we
think of it as a last resort."'61
2. The Norm as a Counterbalance to Inefficient Incentives and
Psychological Tendencies
The norm against litigation might encourage efficient cooperation
more generally. It may achieve this result (1) by facilitating "reasonable"
bargaining and (2) by causing parties to internalize the social costs of the
judicial system.
a. Reasonable Bargaining
Other writers have described mechanisms by which social norms fa-
cilitate efficient cooperation in general. For instance, according to Robert
Cooter and Thomas Ulen, social norms encourage two bargaining parties to
58. See generally Cooter, supra note 32.
59. Even if this explanation of the norm against litigation is correct, potential plaintiffs with large
injuries might still be discouraged somewhat from filing suit. For one thing, the boundary between
"small" and "large" might be vague, and potential plaintiffs might err on the side of caution. More
generally, large lawsuits-just like small lawsuits-might threaten an efficient system of cooperative
norms, if only by familiarizing parties with formal legal procedures and getting them into a legalistic
mind-set.
60. Note that by "small lawsuits" and "large lawsuits," I refer specifically to the extent of the
injury, not to the net expected value of the lawsuit (in view of litigation costs and the probability of
failure). Even a fully rational actor will be more likely to file suits with higher expected values; my
hypothesis here, instead, is that individuals will be particularly unlikely to file a lawsuit in response to a
small injury. Theoretically, this effect could be detected independently from the correlation between the
expected value of a lawsuit and the probability that the suit will be filed.
61. John C. Lindgren & Craig J. Yudell, Protecting American Intellectual Property in Japan, 10
SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. 1, 13 (1994).
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settle on a "reasonable" way to split the surplus that their cooperation cre-
ates. Though both parties may rationally wish to maximize their own share
of the surplus, most parties are unsatisfied with-and may well refuse-a
deal in which the other party appropriates an unfairly large share.62
In some contexts, the norm against litigation may represent a specific
instance of the general norm in favor of reasonable bargaining. Litigation
presents a "bargaining game" of the form described by Cooter and Ulen:
63
that is, two parties have a choice either to cooperate (by settling) or to pur-
sue an expected "threat value" (by suing). The norm against litigation may
discourage parties from attempting to extract unreasonable settlements in
this bargaining game.
First and most obviously, the norm against litigation may discourage
parties from filing a lawsuit merely to increase another party's costs strate-
gically. In a bargaining game, decreasing the other party's threat value-
for example, by increasing the noncooperative costs (such as litigation
costs) for the other party-increases one's ability to extract a settlement on
favorable terms.' In the context of litigation, a "nuisance lawsuit" de-
signed to increase a defendant's costs can increase a plaintiffs bargaining
power even if the plaintiff expects to lose at trial (or to win an insignificant
sum).6 5 A rational, self-interested party therefore has an incentive to file
nuisance lawsuits, even though such lawsuits can result in inefficient-and
unfair-transfers of wealth.
The norm against litigating may discourage parties from engaging in
this kind of profitable but socially inefficient behavior. Indeed, consistent
with this analysis, "nuisance lawsuits" seem to incite particular social dis-
approval, as their name suggests.
Under the view of litigation as a "bargaining game," the norm against
litigation may also serve a more specific role: it may counteract two par-
ticular psychological biases that decrease the likelihood of efficient settle-
ment.
First, plaintiffs' behavior may be affected by a characteristic known as
loss aversion. A plaintiff typically sues because she has experienced a loss;
however, psychological and econometric research suggests that individuals
value losses more highly than perfectly rational actors would.66 For exam-
ple, a shopper might spend time to return a defective $2 product but would
probably not accept $2 from a stranger to drive to a store and return a de-
fective product; more generally, people will exert more effort to avoid a
loss than to garner an equivalent gain. Because a wronged plaintiff may
62. See COOTER & ULEN, supra note 23, at 80 n.5.
63. See id. at 78-80, 415-22.
64. See id.
65. Seeid. at 418-21.
66. See Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, Loss Aversion in Riskless Choice: A Reference-
Dependent Model, 106 Q.J. EcoN. 1039 (1991); see also COOTER & ULEN, supra note 23, at 410.
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irrationally weigh the dollar value of her loss more heavily than, say, the
cost of her lawyer, she may be excessively inclined to sue for compensa-
tion.67
Second, a self-serving bias may encourage plaintiffs to litigate when a
rational party would instead settle. Psychological research suggests that
parties systematically fill informational gaps with self-serving guesses:
[W]hen people rate their chances for personal and professional
success, most unrealistically believe that their chances are better
than average. In one study, Weinstein asked college students
whether they believed their chances of experiencing certain
favorable or unfavorable life events differed from the average
chances of all other students of the same sex at the same college.
Six times the number of students optimistically thought they were
more likely than their average classmate to own their own home
than pessimistically thought they were less likely. Seven times as
many students thought they were less likely than their average
classmate to have a drinking problem than thought they were more
likely.... Similarly, actors tend to be overconfident of their ability
to resolve uncertain factual issues and are particularly likely to be
overconfident where the judgments are difficult.68
If parties systematically overestimate the likelihood of favorable outcomes,
they are likely to overestimate their odds of winning at trial. Because of
this bias, they may have a natural tendency to avoid settlement and to pur-
sue litigation vigorously.
The norm against litigation may thus help, at a wholesale level, to cor-
rect the irrational judgment of individual people. A party may feel confi-
dent in his ability to win at trial, for instance, but may decide not to sue
because of the social disapproval that he would suffer if he initiates a law-
suit (or because he has internalized a norm against litigating).
67. For an opposing view that emphasizes the plaintiff's gain from litigating rather than the prior
loss associated with the injury that gives rise to litigation, see Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, Gains, Losses, and
the Psychology ofLitigation, 70 S. CAL. L. REV. 113, 129 (1996) (footnote omitted):
When deciding whether to settle a case, plaintiffs consistently choose between a sure gain by
settling and the prospect of winning more at trial. This closely resembles a gains frame,
although losing at trial may entail the loss of one's attorney's fees and may therefore be a
mixed loss/gain prospect. Conversely, defendants choose between a sure loss by settling and
the prospect of losing more at trial. This is a choice made in a loss frame. Hence, cross-claims
aside, litigation presents a fairly consistent frame.
Rachlinski does note, however, that "plaintiffs may have [an] interest in pursuing litigation as a means
of avenging or publicizing a personal grievance." Id. However, he does not suggest that loss aversion
may cause plaintiffs to assign excessive weight to a prior loss.
In general, loss aversion reflects the way in which a party "frames" a change in utility, so both
alternative explanations (mine and Rachlinski's) may be plausible on a theoretical level; empirical
testing would be required to decide which account more accurately describes potential plaintiffs.
68. Melvin Aron Eisenberg, The Limits of Cognition and the Limits of Contract, 47 STAN. L.
REV. 211, 217 (1995) (footnote omitted); see also COOTER & ULEN, supra note 23, at 407-12
(discussing "relative optimism" in litigation).
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b. Externalities
One party's decision to litigate also imposes external costs on other
parties-specifically, on her opponent and on the judge and potential jurors
in her case. The norm against litigation may, because of the social punish-
ment or guilt it engenders, help parties internalize the social costs they im-
pose when they decide to initiate a lawsuit.
However, it is important not to overplay the externalized costs of liti-
gation. Society chooses to fund the judiciary rather than to require parties
to bear the costs of the judge, jury, and judicial system generally.6 9
Moreover, a public judiciary yields the public good associated with pub-
licly available precedent.7" Still, particularly in small cases, the norm
against litigation may help parties to consider the effects of their decisions
on others.
III
EXPLANATIONS OF THE NORM IN TERMS OF PRIVATE INTERESTS
As David Charny has suggested, norms are not necessarily efficient;
they may "favor the members of ... concentrated interest groups, at the
expense of more diffuse members."'" Certainly, some members of soci-
ety-those who are particularly likely to be sued, such as manufacturers
and doctors-may benefit more from the social norm against litigation than
others. Indeed, it appears that manufacturers, doctors, and those who rep-
resent them have attempted, through political and lobbying organizations,
to strengthen the norm against litigation.73
In general, it is not puzzling that a group that stands to benefit from a
norm would invest resources in promoting the norm. The puzzle is why
others accept the norm even despite their own interests. In an article on
corporate law and social norms, Professor Eisenberg suggests two reasons
that parties might adopt norms that don't appear to benefit them: first, they
69. For considerations behind this decision, see COOTER & ULEN, supra note 23, at 435.
70. See id. at 439.
71. David Chamy, Illusions of a Spontaneous Order: "Norms "' in Contractual Relationships, 144
U. PA. L. REV 1841, 1848 (1996). See also Geoffrey P. Miller, Norms and Interests, 32 HOFSTRA L.
REV. 637 (2003) (discussing social norms from the perspective of public-choice theory).
72. Though manufacturers and service providers can spread litigation costs among their
customers, doing so will result in higher prices and may thus decrease demand. Moreover, litigation can
often impose unpredictable costs, which are difficult to spread in advance.
73. For instance, the Republican Party generally tends to advocate "tort reform." See supra note
13 and accompanying text. See also Group Says Companies Sue More Often Than Individuals, NAT'L
J. CONGRESS DAILY, Oct. 5, 2004 ("[T]here are unscrupulous trial lawyers out there who are clogging
our courts with frivolous lawsuits that are driving doctors out of business.... They're sending
employers into bankruptcy and, in the end, raising prices on consumers.") (quoting a vice president of
the U.S. Chamber of Commerce Institute for Legal Reform).
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may need the support of those whom the norm does benefit; second, they
may internalize the norm. 4
In the situation Professor Eisenberg discusses, parties adopted a harm-
ful norm because they were members of an establishment-a powerful,
concentrated group-whose other members benefited from the norm.75
This situation does not apply to the norm against litigation, however.
Instead, members of the public may internalize the norm against litiga-
tion-even if it is promoted by parties with opposing interests-because it
resonates with their own moral propositions. As I will discuss in Part IV,
people's moral values may counsel against stem, legalistic adversarialism
and in favor of forgiveness and informal procedures.
Moreover, bounded rationality may explain, in psychological terms,
why people internalize even harmful norms. When faced with complicated
situations and limited information, people apply heuristics and generally
try to make "satisfactory substantive decisions" instead of "optimal
substantive decisions."76 Thus, people may come to believe-particularly if
they are told by politicians with whom they may share other values-that
litigating is not really in their interests; they may, for instance, accept
Abraham Lincoln's advice merely on Lincoln's word, not on an independ-
ent cost-benefit analysis.
The recent empirical study suggesting that corporations engage in
more suits than individuals represented by trial lawyers77 is consistent with
this explanation of the norm against litigation for two reasons. First, the
managers of corporations will hardly feel bound by a norm if they have
deliberately promoted it only for self-interested reasons. Second, corpora-
tions are less likely than individuals to be limited by bounded rationality."
IV
NONECONOMIC EXPLANATIONS OF THE NORM
This Part considers noneconomic purposes that the norm against liti-
gation might serve. Specifically, it attempts to provide accounts for the
74. See Eisenberg, supra note 5, at 1288 (discussing the historical norm against corporate hostile
takeovers and noting that "investment banks, commercial banks, and law firms adhered to the norm
partly because they were concerned that they would lose corporate business if they were perceived as
norm-violators, and partly because as members of the establishment they internalized the norm"). Note
that even if one internalizes a norm unconsciously, one may follow the norm consciously. Such norms
therefore still satisfy the definition of "norm" I use. See supra note 5.
75. See id.
76. Eisenberg, supra note 68, at 214-16.
77. See supra note 39 and accompanying text.
78. However, because corporations are probably also less likely to experience other human
biases, such as loss aversion and self-serving heuristics, the norm against litigation may be less relevant
to them anyway; that is, it may be efficient for the norm to affect the behavior of corporations less than
that of individuals.
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norm in terms of (1) moral philosophy and (2) psychological observa-
tions that are unrelated to economic efficiency.
A. Explanations Rooted in Moral Philosophy
The New Testament has harsh words for those who pursue law-
suits: "Now therefore there is utterly a fault among you, because ye go to
law one with another. Why do ye not rather take wrong? why do ye not
rather suffer yourselves to be defrauded?"79 That is, even if someone ex-
periences a wrong, there might be virtue in simply accepting it--or in ad-
dressing it using personal, friendly means-rather than in contesting it
adamantly.8 °
Indeed, many moral philosophers-even, of course, those whose
scholarship does not depend on the Bible-have discussed the role that
"mercy" and related values can play in human affairs and in the law.8 For
instance, Jeffrie Murphy discusses mercy in the private law as follows:
[T]he virtue of mercy is revealed when a person, out of compassion
for the hard position of the person who owes him an obligation,
waives the right that generates the obligation and frees the
individual of the burden of that obligation. People who are always
standing on their rights, indifferent to the impact this may have on
others, are simply intolerable. Such persons cannot be faulted on
grounds of justice, but they can certainly be faulted. And the
disposition to mercy helps to check these narrow and self-involved
tendencies present in each of us.82
Thus, Murphy makes a moral claim that is parallel to an instrumental claim
that this Comment made earlier. That is, just as the norm against litigation
may, from an instrumental perspective, help correct inefficient tendencies
that result from self-serving biases, the disposition toward mercy might
79. 1 Corinthians 6:7 (King James). This moral criticism of litigation is found outside Western
religion as well. See, e.g., F.S.C. NORTHROP, THE COMPLEXITY OF LEGAL AND ETHICAL EXPERIENCE;
STUDIES IN THE METHOD OF NORMATIVE SUBJECTS 184-85 ("The moral man, Confucius teaches, does
not indulge in litigation."). As Northrop notes, "Codes there may be, but they are to be used only as a
last resort, and even then recourse to them brings shame upon the disputants." Id.
80. This is particularly true in most noncommercial contexts. Cf Melvin Aron Eisenberg, The
World of Contract and the World of Gift, 85 CALIF. L. REV. 821, 847-50 (1997) (arguing that some
personal interactions-such as gifts motivated by "love, affection, friendship, gratitude, and
comradeship"-would "be impoverished if [they] were to be collapsed into the world of [legally
enforceable] contract").
81. See, e.g., Martha Nussbaum, Equity and Mercy, PHIL. & PUB. AFF., Spr. 1993, at 83; Jeffrie
Murphy, Mercy and Legal Justice, in JEFFRIE MURPHY & JEAN HAMPTON, FORGIVENESS AND MERCY
162 (1988). To understand the role of mercy, it is important to keep in mind that justice is not
necessarily the only moral value that individuals care about; similarly, it is not necessarily the only
deontological goal of the law. For a general discussion of moral norms and the law, see EISENBERG,
supra note 53, at 14-26.
82. Murphy, supra note 81, at 176.
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help correct "narrow and self-involved tendencies"83 that are inappropriate
or morally impoverished.
In view of this understanding of mercy, an individual who initiates a
lawsuit may be seen-and may see himself or herself-as inappropriately
"narrow" or "self-involved" or as lacking in "compassion." We may want
to "fault" such individuals for "standing on their rights,"84 even if we rec-
ognize that individual utility (or even the general welfare) might be en-
hanced by a strict application of justice.
This moral criticism of those who exercise their rights too vigorously
may, of course, bolster a norm against using courts to press rights. The
norm against litigation may thus represent not a norm against using courts
per se but a norm against attempting to effect harsh justice without regard
for another person's "hard position." This sort of moral criticism may help
explain the public's general disapproval of lawsuits like those initiated by
the Recording Industry Association of America (RIAA) against individuals
who may have shared music illegally.85 Commentators may argue that even
if the RIAA has the right to recover damages from individuals, it is un-
seemly or "self-involved" for the RIAA to sue individuals-often young
individuals whose resources are relatively modest-to pursue this right.86
Mercy and related values are sometimes alternatively expressed in
terms of an actor's motives. For instance, Gregory W. Trianosky discusses
cases in which someone
expresses a narrowly legalistic attitude toward morality by
asserting his rights .... It is not that what he does is wrong,
considered independently of its motive; for our common-sense
principles of moral obligation are narrow and legalistic here.
Nevertheless, the agent reveals a genuinely vicious motivation in
his coldly calculated insistence on what is rightftlly his.87
Trianosky notes that "what is impermissible [in these cases] is something
like 'doing-what-one-has-a-right-to-do-for-cold-hearted-reasons."' 88  Tri-
anosky's conception of cold-hearted justice might apply to so-called nui-
sance lawsuits-lawsuits that are legal but implemented for selfish
motives, rather than to address a genuine wrong. It would certainly apply to
83. Id.
84. Id.
85. See generally Assaf Hamdani & Alon Klement, The Class Defense, 93 CALIF. L. REV. 685
(2005) (citing individual lawsuits by the RIAA).
86. More generally, this mercy-based explanation for the norm against litigation generates an
empirically testable proposition: plaintiffs will be less likely to sue defendants who are in what Murphy
calls a "hard position." Of course, defendants who are in financial trouble are less likely to be solvent,
so plaintiffs may have other reasons to avoid suing them. Still, an empirical analysis should be able to
demonstrate a separate effect based specifically on conditions we associate with mercy.
87. Gregory W. Trianosky, Supererogation, Wrongdoing, and Vice: On the Autonomy of the
Ethics of Virtue, 83 J. PHIL. 26, 34-35 (1986).
88. Id. at 35 n.9.
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situations in which one party uses a legal loophole to exploit another, or in
which parties-as in some cases of divorce-use courts to pursue cruel or
vindictive motives. 89
This analysis of the morality of mercy cuts through the central puzzle
raised by the norm against litigation-why seeking justice through lawsuits
violates a social norm. That is, the answer to the question may simply be
that justice and efficiency are not the only important values. To pursue jus-
tice out of "narrow and self-involved tendencies ' is not virtuous, and to
exercise a formal right out of cruelty may positively represent a vice.9'
However, the law is not always sensitive to the circumstances of both
parties. For instance, courts are not typically able (and may appropriately
be unwilling) to determine the motives of the plaintiff or to detect the "hard
position" of the defendant, so law alone cannot easily prevent the exercise
of poor motives or the implementation of harsh "justice." The norm against
litigation may be a way for our society to curb selfish motives and socially
unacceptable harshness; if law cannot deter such cases, perhaps social pun-
ishment or an internalized norm can.
B. Explanations Rooted in Perceptions of the Legal Process
Separately, the norm against litigation might result simply from criti-
cism of the existing legal process, or it might result from a mismatch be-
tween people's intuitions about fairness and the nature of common-law
adjudication.9"
The details of the American legal process may be imperfect, and criti-
cism of these details may inspire distrust of the legal process generally.93
This distrust, in turn, may give rise to a norm against litigating. People
might not want to take part in a system they don't think is fair-or they
89. More generally, pursuing a lawsuit may reflect, in many people's judgment, a tendency
toward greed or opportunism-or simply an excessive concern with money or an insufficient concern
with the communitarian ideal. Cf supra text accompanying note 12 (suggesting an association between
the "decline of the church, family and neighborhood unity" and the increase in the role of courts).
It is possible that the norm against litigation is weaker for lawsuits seeking injunctive relief than
for those seeking damages. Money's inability to compensate fully for intangible harms may contribute
to the skepticism of a lawsuit's virtue. For instance, one might advise a friend that a lawsuit won't
eliminate the pain she suffers from an accident.
90. Murphy, supra note 81, at 176.
91. Consider Inspector Javert, the famous policeman ofLes Miserables who is widely known as
one who pressed justice too harshly. Describing Javert, Victor Hugo suggests that "[i]ntegrity,
sincerity, honesty, conviction, the sense of duty, these are qualities which, being misguided, may
become hideous" and sees in Javert "all the evil in what is good." VICTOR HUGO, LES MISERABLES 267-
68 (Norman Denny trans., Penguin Books 1982) (1862).
92. Thomas Tyler draws a distinction between "evaluations of the enactment of decision-making
procedures" and "evaluations of the procedures themselves." THOMAS TYLER, WHY PEOPLE OBEY THE
LAW 111-12 (1990). By referring to criticisms of the "existing legal process," I refer to the latter; by
referring to the mismatch between people's familiar intuitions about justice and the nature of common-
law adjudication, I refer to the former.
93. See id. at 109-12.
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might be criticized for doing so-even if they stand to gain from an indi-
vidual transaction with the system.
Thomas Tyler summarizes literature on dissatisfaction with the legal
system and suggests avenues for further research:
Past treatments of public dissatisfaction with the courts and the law
have emphasized public dissatisfaction with the outcomes that the
courts produce. Examples of this focus on outcomes include
concerns about the failure of the courts to dispose of cases quickly,
or to give sentences of adequate length. According to a perspective
based on justice, citizens' concerns should be viewed as part of
their general view about fairness of procedure and fairness of
outcome. It may be that procedural irregularities, such as criminals
being let free on "technicalities," are particularly important in
feeding public dissatisfaction with the courts.94
Though this discussion focuses on criminal law, a general dissatisfaction
with the legal system might translate to a personal refusal---or to social
encouragement to refuse-to deal with the legal system, even despite per-
sonal economic interest. An individual wronged by a court in the past-
either because she faced a delay or other administrative problem, because
she disagreed with a prior outcome, or because she experienced a proce-
dure that she judged to be unfair-may, out of distaste for the legal system,
be disinclined to initiate a lawsuit.
Tyler also distinguishes formal from informal legal proceedings, and
he notes that "informal legal procedures may correspond more closely than
trials to people's intuitions about what is a fair procedure." '95 Tyler suggests
several reasons that ordinary citizens might intuitively prefer informal pro-
cedures. First, informal procedures may offer "greater opportunities for
direct participation than formal trials do and may allow the decision maker
more flexibility to be sensitive to people's interpersonal concerns."96
Second, ordinary citizens may not have direct experience with the sorts of
problems that legal procedures are designed to protect them from.97 For
example, they might not understand why a particular rule of evidence or
civil procedure is fair. Instead, they might apply heuristics concerning jus-
tice or efficiency that are suitable for the situations they typically face but
unsuitable for a national or even a statewide legal system. As a result, they
may think that the legal process is arcane, impersonal, or generally insensi-
tive to their values. They might therefore be less inclined to initiate a law-
suit than they would otherwise be, and they might presume that others who
initiate lawsuits do not share their values. Indeed, one recent commentator
94. Id. at 109-10.
95. Id. at 155.
96. Id.
97. See id.
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criticizes the adversarial legal system by drawing an interesting historical
parallel with "trial by battle":
[T]rial by combat and trial by [legal argument] suffer from similar
defects as a means of determining the truth: the inherent inaccuracy
of the adversary method, the reliance on professional
representatives, and conscious antiquarianism.... The defects of
trial by argument are more severe because this mode of trial is less
justifiable according to our beliefs than trial by battle was
according to the beliefs of people in the Middle Ages. In other
words, the fit between the theory and the practice that it justified
was better for medieval trial by battle than for modem trial by
argument.98
In short, individuals may not wish to initiate lawsuits because they
simply don't like the legal system-either because it presents particular
operational faults or because its fundamental design does not match com-
monly workable notions of fairness or efficiency.
V
NORMATIVE IMPLICATIONS
The persuasiveness (or lack thereof) of this Comment's teleological
justifications for the norm against litigation should affect the way we un-
derstand the norm. For instance, if we cannot find-despite our earnest
searches-a plausible justification for the norm, we have no reason, short
of sentiment or fear of change, to continue to accept it; we should instead
consider rejecting it, as Richard Abel does. 99
On the other hand, if we find a plausible explanation, then we need to
look to the basis of the explanation to gauge our appropriate level of sup-
port or skepticism for the norm. For example, if the norm promotes social
welfare-and if it is consonant with our moral values-we should support
it. If the norm comes from the manipulative efforts of a self-interested
group, we should either-if we are rational and purely selfish-determine
whether we are part of the group that benefits from the norm or-if we in-
tend to promote social welfare-determine whether the norm results in an
aggregate gain or loss. Alternatively, to the extent that the norm arises be-
cause of people's distrust of the legal process, we should either address
courts' perceived problems or educate citizens about their unavoidability.
Our decision, as Abel suggests, affects the tort-reform debate. 00 It
also can affect the scope and extent of attorney sanctions for frivolous
98. Edward L. Rubin, Trial by Battle. Trial by Argument., 56 ARK. L. REV. 261, 280 (2003)
(emphasis added).
99. See generally Richard L. Abel, The Real Tort Crisis-Too Few Claims, 48 OHIo ST. L.J. 443,
467 (1987) ("To assert a legal claim is to perform a vital civic obligation.").
100. See id. (arguing that characterizations of Americans as litigious "are unsubstantiated and
false" and that tort reform should focus on "responding to a higher proportion of victims").
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lawsuits, and it can influence the rules by which attorneys operate more
generally. For instance, to serve their clients properly, attorneys should
make sure to account for all of their clients' economic costs and benefits-
and perhaps their social costs and benefits as well. 1 '
CONCLUSION
This Comment has advanced several accounts of the American norm
against litigation-that is, of the practice of forgoing an opportunity to file
a lawsuit with a positive net expected value. Some accounts suggest that
the norm serves to promote social welfare or morality. Another account
suggests that the norm instead has a manipulative quality. Still others, such
as Eric Posner's signaling theory, make no value judgment.
Some of the accounts developed in this Comment suggest empirical
tests; others appeal only, at this stage, to intuition. Either way, reaching a
consensus on the nature and function of the norm-a consensus that might
ultimately merge several of the independent accounts this Comment of-
fers-can inform lawyers and other policymakers who promote or oppose
the norm.
101. The American Bar Association's Model Rules of Professional Conduct allow attorneys to
"refer not only to law but to other considerations such as moral, economic, social and political factors,
that may be relevant to the client's situation." MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 2.1 (2004).
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